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ABSTRACT: This paper presents on-going work in the scope of development of a new methodology of safety
analysis taking into account pilot’s behavior. The initial part of the research deals with understanding pilot error
and to model his behavior against required tasks. The paper presents the methodology and the tool developed for
this purpose.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Flight travel has become safer and safer over the
years thanks to the various state-of-the-art technolo-
gies used in design and development of the aircraft
(Clinton V. Oster Jr. 2013). But, the human error as
cause of accident still remains at the same ratio. It
was shown in a research by 1 the cause of human er-
ror due to bad decision making amounts to around 25
percent (Wiegmann & Shappell 2011). Researchers
are trying to study what more (or in some case -
less) information should be given to the pilot in or-
der to improve his decision making and reduce any
chances of error. Our research has the same objec-
tive, i.e, to provide the pilot with information about
what might go wrong based on the current situation
he is in. For example, based on the descend trend
at a particular instant, an automated analysis is per-
formed and then the pilot is informed of the possible
hazardous situation he might enter into. In this pro-
cess, the time is of the utmost importance in order to
perform a possible corrective maneuver. One of our
objectives in this study is to develop a safety analysis
method that takes into account pilot’s task behavior.
To do this a new hazard analysis technique devel-
oped in MIT, USA called STAMP-STPA has been
used (Leveson 2011).
The paper presents this new hazard analysis process
in the second section. Third section explains the
methodology used to meet that objective. Fourth sec-
tions details about modeling the pilot task behavior,
moving on to the fifth section where the use of ADS-B
data in our project has been described. The follow-
ing section introduces the tool developed for carrying
out the aforementioned analysis. Some results and
conclusions are presented at the end.
2 STAMP and STPA
This section defines the STAMP process model, the
hazard analysis process based on STAMP called
STPA, and a brief introduction to use STPA.
System Theoretic Accident Modeling Processes
(STAMP) is a methodology used to model a system
and/or a process. It is based on the concepts of Sys-
tems Engineering and Control Theory. The model-
ing is done on the base of functional structure rather
than the physical component structure. The entire
process is classified in different level of complexities
starting from the most complex at the top and then
going down to the least complex at the bottom. This
complexity corresponds to the functions performed at
each level. Each level has a controller and a process as
shown in Figure 1. Each controller gives some control
actions as input to the process and receives feedback
from the process. (Thomas 2017)
Controller
Controlled Process
Process Model
Control Actions Feedback
Figure 1 – Control based STAMP model
According to this modeling, an associated definition
of failure is proposed, thus failure is defined as loss
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of control since the focus is on early functional archi-
tecture instead of physical one. The basic ideology is
that there have been incidents in the past where nei-
ther components failed nor humans made error yet
accidents occured (Nancy Leveson & Marais 2003).
Another useful concept in safety is the hazardous con-
dition depicting the result of a failure in the STAMP
framework.
Moreover, STAMP offers a collection of processes, in-
cluding a System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA),
which is of interest for our study. STPA is a top-
down method that makes use of a control structure.
It is performed in following two steps (Leveson &
Thomas 2013) :
• Define Accidents and Hazards (associated with
these accidents) and obtain loss of control that
can lead to a hazardous state
• Identify how these unsafe control actions could oc-
cur in the control structure.
Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) are the commands
given by the controller to the process that can result
in a hazardous situation. UCA is defined as:
Context + ControlAction + Hazard
Here, Context is defined as the scenario or condition
or constraint that helps us in assigning safe or unsafe
nature to a control action (Thomas 2013). For exam-
ple, one can imagine that the pilot lowers the landing
gear, this is a control action but it becomes an unsafe
control action if it is lowered at a high speed and at a
high altitude, as it increases the drag on the aircraft
and it becomes even more critical if there is a criti-
cal situation like fuel starvation. This might result in
stall. Hence it is very important to carefully consider
the context.
According to STPA there are four types of possible
unsafe control actions:
• Providing a control action will cause a hazard. In
this case, the control action may be tagged as
”inappropriate”.
• Not providing a control action will cause a hazard.
This is the absence of a required control action.
• Providing it too early/too late will cause a hazard.
The focus is on the time at which a control action
is provided.
• Providing it for too long or stopping it too soon
will cause a hazard (this is more applicable when
the input is continuous). The focus is on the
duration of the control action.
Given these STAMP and STPA concepts, our study
relates to an original approach enabling to extend
STPA analysis for on-line safety analysis.
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section defines the approach used in order to
integrate the concept of unsafe control actions with
safety analysis.
As aforementioned, the UCA concept becomes a cen-
tral component of our methodology, which requires to
formalize it. For that, a formal tabular specification
(Russo, Miller, Nuseibeh & Kramer 2000) is used to
define the unsafe control action ucaij , such as for any
i, j :
ucaij = < Ci, UCj , uij >
where:
• C represents the Context, i.e. the current
state variables characterizing the system behav-
ior with its given environment; then, Ci is the
ith element of this list of context.
• UC stands for the type of the control action as
defined in STAMP; we assume there are 6 types
as described below.
• u corresponds to the textual description of the
hazard of the concerned unsafe control action;
i, j is for the posiion of the cell in the table.
An illustration of STPA table structure is shown in
table 1, where n > m.
UC1 UC2 UC3 UC4
C1 u11 u12 u13 u14
. . . . .
Cn un1 un2 un3 un4
. . . . .
Cm um1 um2 um3 um4
Table 1 – Unsafe Control Actions table
On the one hand, this UCA table structure implic-
itly reveals a time characteristic for a control action
(noted ca, later on). Let be t0 the starting time whose
discrete value belongs to ok,+,−,∞, ok is the appro-
priate time, + too late time, - too early, and ∞ for
absence of ca . Similarly, td the duration whose value
belongs to ok,+,−, ok is the appropriate duration, +
too long, and - too short.
On the other hand, the types of UCA 3 and 4 are split
hereafter, since their description states two distinct
features. Therefore, the type rearrangement is given
as follows:
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• UC1: for providing ca which is inappropriate,
noted uca(t0 = ok, td = ok).
• UC2: for absence of ca, noted ca(t0 = ∞, td =
ok).
• UC3: for providing ca too early, noted ca(t0 =
−, td = ok).
• UC4: for providingca too late, noted ca(t0 =
+, td = ok).
• UC5: for stopping ca too soon, noted ca(t0 =
ok, td = −).
• UC6: for a long duration of ca, noted ca(t0 =
ok, td = +).
Contrary to the UCA types, the Context relies on ac-
tual data extracting from aircraft actual behavior. To
be relevant, these data are given by actual records of
several flights, in approach phase for our study case.
The process using this data base is described here-
after.
Figure 2 explains the proecess of our study.
Pilot’s Task Behaviour
ADS-B Data
Process Control Structure
Hazard Identification 
(Performed Manually)
STAMP
STPA
Predictions of 
Unsafe Control 
Actions
Safety Constraints 
(Requirements)
Figure 2 – Methodology
Our proposed methodology deals with studying a very
critical phase of a flight, e.g. approach phase. This
methodology consists of several steps depicted as fol-
lows:
Step1 : To build an initial STPA table in order to
obtain control actions.
Step2 : To collect data in order to understand how
pilot actually perform successful approaches. To
do this, ADS-B was used.
Step3 : To develop and use a tool that takes current
position of the aircraft and improves STPA anal-
ysis in order to list unsafe control actions that a
pilot might give.
As far as the prediction of UCA is concerned, STPA
table and the ADS-B data base are necessary for
the tool to be developed, however the performance
of the prediction would actually be improved if we
are able to add a model of pilot tasks, which reduces
the number of possible irrelevant unsafe control ac-
tions. For multiple failure, we assume for instance
that an UCA4 can not be immediately followed by
an UCA3, thus, the time analysis is taken into ac-
count (Bruggemann & Campbell 2017).
The next section shows an ideal pilot task model
that we would like to generate automatically from
the STPA table, ADS-B and official procedures.
4 MODELLING PILOT TASK BE-
HAVIOUR
The first part of the research deals with model-
ing the behavior of pilot in response to tasks that
he/she has to perform. To be able to do that the
available manuscripts that aid pilot in training and
subsequently performing certain tasks, e.g., FCTM,
FCOM, and SOPs are used. (To be noted that
these are not the official documents from aircraft
manufacturers but the ones available online. ref:
www.airbusdriver.net) Since our study is based on
one of the most critical phase of flight, i.e., approach
and landing, we will, for the moment, look only
at those actions that will be performed during this
phase. Figure 3 gives an idea of the task performed
during approach phase.
Flaps at Initial Setting
Localizer + Glidescope 
Capture
Gear Down
Flaps Full
Landing Checklist
Stable Approach
Decision Height
(Continue/Go Around 
Decision)
Flare and Touch Down
Figure 3 – Approach Procedure
These tasks are to be performed by the pilots at cer-
tain altitude, speed and at required distance from the
Touch Down Zone. It can be seen that these tasks
correspond to some actions that the pilots have to
perform. Each time they perform these tasks they
need to make certain decisions based on current state
of the aircraft, environmental conditions and other
external factors (like Air Traffic Controllers instruc-
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tions). We tried to study the hazardous conditions
that might exist and based on it we constructed a
flowchart (Figure 4). This flowchart enables us to im-
prove STPA analysis by providing important control
actions. It also gives some idea on some decisions that
the pilots make based on their mental model (expere-
ince, fatigue, stress level, etc.). These are different
from the actions he performs based on the prescribed
procedures. We call these two type of decisions as
procedure based decisions (represented in Figure 4 as
white diamonds) and human factors based decisions
(represented as black diamonds)
Perform Landing Checklist
Complete
Stabilize Approach for 
ILS
Yes
Stable
Yes
Obtain Landing Clearance
Decision height
Flare
Decision time
(t=5s)
Touchdown
t<5s
Decision time
(t=5s)
Brake
Thrust Idle
Committed to Stop
Yes
Rev Thrust
Disengage A/P
No & (t>10s)
Decision
Increase descent
Safe
Decision time
(t=5s)
Touch Down/Thrust 
Idle
t>3s
Touch Down 
zone
Go aroundUnsafe
t<3s
Touch and Go
Unsafe
Safe
Committed to 
Stop
Brake Rev Thrust
Disengage A/P
No
Yes
Perform Required 
Actions
No
No & (t<10s)
No
Continue
Go around
Aware & (t>5s) Unaware & (t<5s)
Touch and Go
Aware & (t>5s) Unaware & (t<5s)
Take of Thrust 
applied
No
Stop
Feared Event:
CRASH!!
Figure 4 – Pilot Task Flowchart
Based on this model we obtain control actions that
we use next. The next section gets an insight into the
utilization of ADS-B for actual pilot behavior.
5 ADS-B DATA
ADS-B stands for Automated Dependent Surveillance
- Broadcast, it is a technology that helps an aircraft
obtain its position based on satellite navigation and
broadcasts it. This allows ground based receivers to
track an aircraft. This is very useful for ATC and
other aircraft to know exact position of other air-
craft in order to maintain safe separation. The ADS-
B data packet contain information about the track,
ground speed, call-sign (it is a type of aircraft iden-
tifier) and position of the aircraft. ADS-B data help
on-line flight tracking platforms to track air traffic in
real time.
We have used the data from various approach pat-
terns of Airbus A320 aircraft in Toulouse, Blagnac
airport (ICAO: LFBO). We extract data that enables
us to understand how diferent pilots react in certain
situations while performing the required task. This
was done by studying how the speed and altitude
changes with time (Figure 5).
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Figure 5 – Altitude and Speed vs Time
Studying these graphs over a wide range of data will
provide us an understanding of the normal trends of
altitude and speed change for successful landings that
might help us define our safety margin.
Another interesting plot that was extracted was Al-
titude vs Speed. This was particularly interesting as
this eliminated time variable. Since not all pilot per-
form similar actions at same time, it is interesting to
find a way to find a common performance graph.
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Figure 6 – Altitude vs Speed
Figure 6 shows an example Altitude vs Speed graph.
It is normal to have an approach curve like this, it
should not be confused with unstable flight as the
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curve doesn’t represent the actual position of the air-
craft. It shows the trends in altitude and speed. Some
sudden spikes and drops in the curves arise mainly
due to missing data or some changes that occur due
to operational reasons like extension of landing gears,
etc.
6 INTRODUCTION TO THE TOOL
The authors decided to develop a tool that can au-
tomatically perform the analysis. MATLAB based
GUIDE (Graphical User Interface Development En-
vironment) is used to build this tool. The tool takes
ADS-B data as the input and predicts unsafe control
actions. It also plots an altitude vs speed diagram
of the approach in order to compare it to safe ap-
proach patterns. Figure 7 shows the layout of the
tool. It has a mode selection switch that decides
whether data will be taken automatically or must be
entered manually. There is an input box that allows
data to be entered manually. The output box presents
results from the analysis. And the nominal perfor-
mance curve plots the fitted curve based on the data
points that are input.
Figure 7 – Screenshot of the Tool
The tool carries out following tasks.
• Taking position, speed and heading values from
ADS-B receiver and importing it in a .csv file
(done in ”Automatic” mode). This can also be
input manually by selecting ”Manual” from the
Mode Selection Switch.
• Plot a nominal approach Altitude vs. Speed curve
for a particular aircraft type and a particular air-
port. It is done in the ”Nominal Performance
Curve”.
• Based on the values of Altitude and Speed assume
which step of procedure the pilot will perform
next. Compare the current action to actions in
future and list down possible unsafe control ac-
tions in the output box.
In order to performance the analysis following steps
are performed:
• Define the nominal approach curve based on the
values obtained from ADS-B data.
• Select a point for which we want to study the sce-
nario, or perform our analysis. This is crucial
as the aircraft is constantly moving instead of
performing the analysis every second it might be
interesting to do it over a time zone for which
the conditions remain same, and change it over
to the next zone as soon as it passes to the next
scenario.
• We use data from the aircraft to obtain a safety
margin. This is obtained by plotting all the safe
landings over a period of time and then based on
extreme points making a safe envelope.
• Calculate the distance of our selected point from
the safety margin.
• Based on this distance define the context for unsafe
control action (e.g., Low/high speed (if the speed
difference is too much) and same for altitude).
It is done by obtaining the factor (altitude or
speed) that is farthest from the safe margin and
use that as ”critical” because it will be difficult
to achieve.
• Based on the context and current position populate
the list of unsafe control action on the tool.
7 RESULTS
Once all the Unsafe Control Actions were defined,
they were entered in the tool for analysis of an aircraft
in real time. The tool provides us with results in the
output box in ucaij = < Ci, UCj , uij > format. For
example in Figure 8, based on current altitude and
speed performing the next control action will result
in stall due to increase drag. Here the context is low
speed and the corresponding hazard is Stall.
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Figure 8 – An output on the Tool
It can be seen that the safety margin is obtained as
an envelope and is presented in dotted lines in Figure
9.
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Figure 9 – Safety Margin
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
This tool was necessary to better visualize the study
for ourselves and to be able to distribute as a stand-
alone application to Engineers and pilots to collect
data and have their feedback. As mentioned the tool
is in the preliminary stage although it can perform
some analysis at this level too. A mid-term progress
would be to perform some real time tests on sim-
ulator to evaluate the performance of the tool and
to improve it. At present a safety margin has been
obtained and the tool can base its analysis on this
safety margin. However, as part of current work, ma-
chine learning is being introduced in order to have
a safety envelope that is more accurate. Machine
Learning/Neural Networks can also be implemented
to automatically select a context based on the posi-
tion of the aircraft, pilot’s previous actions, and the
environment in real time (wind, etc..). This tool will
also be proposed to a discussion with pilot’s and have
their feedback. This is also very important in order
to validate the tool.
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